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1.4 The Best Story of the World




In the first half of the nineteenth century, philological readings of the Scriptures 
and new approaches in geology – set down, most importantly, in Charles Lyell’s 
Principles of Geology (1830-1833) – uncovered the various strata of the Book of 
Books and the Book of Nature, respectively. The result of applying the historical-
critical method to the Scriptures was precisely the discovery of its historicity: as 
philologists and – mainly Protestant – theologians such as Friedrich Schleier-
macher and David Friedrich Strauss – whose The Life of Jesus, Critically Exam-
ined (1835-1836) was disseminated in Britain in George Eliot’s influential transla-
tion (1849) – could show, the various books of the Bible had been composed at 
different points in time and by different authors.1 The empirical study of geologi-
cal formations resulted not only in the realization that the age of the earth by far 
surpassed the six thousand years allotted by the Bible, but also that geological 
processes were dynamic albeit often infinitesimally slow.2 As Lyell stated, ‘this 
planet’ could no longer be regarded ‘as having remained unaltered since its crea-
tion’, since modern geologists had ‘proved that it had been the theater of reiterated 
change, and was still the subject of slow but never ending fluctuations’.3 Neither 
the earth nor the Scriptures were static, neither had emerged through a single 
act of creation or revelation; rather, both were the result of slow processes of loss 
(erosion, textual corruption) and accretion (sedimentation in a geological as well 
as a philological sense). In a parallel process in the humanities and the sciences, 
divine authority was undermined by the emergence of new methodologies: the 
Book of Nature was found to be author-less; natural phenomena emerged un-
der the influence of secondary causes; any reference to a first mover had become 
dispensable. The authorship of the Book of Books, conversely, now appeared as 
decentered, not revealed by the Holy Spirit, but composed by various human 
authors.
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This story of the emergence of the modern disciplines has been told, for ex-
ample, by Lyell himself, as a linear history of progress:
By degrees, many of the enigmas of the moral and physical world are ex-
plained, and, instead of being due to extrinsic and irregular causes, they 
are found to depend on fixed and invariable laws. The philosopher at last 
becomes convinced of the undeviating uniformity of secondary causes, 
and, guided by his faith in this principle, he determines the probability of 
accounts transmitted to him of former occurrences, and often rejects the 
fabulous tales of former ages, on the ground of their being irreconcilable 
with the experience of more enlightened ages.4
One of the aims of this paper is to show that the emergence of new methodolo-
gies, new epistemic virtues and institutionalized disciplines as we still know them 
is more complex and contradictory than Lyell’s statement suggests. Not only was 
the relationship between the natural sciences and the humanities much more dia-
logic than a retrospective construction of the ‘two cultures’ implies; additionally, 
the notion of a continuous, progressive advancement of knowledge was challenged 
by competing efforts to tell a different story about the natural world, a story based 
on the apparently repudiated view of an unchanging creation. Nineteenth-cen-
tury historicism was thus questioned by an alternative temporal concept which 
suggested breaks – caused by divine intervention – in the unidirectional flow of 
time.5 While in retrospect, the ‘victors’ of this epistemological debate – Charles 
Lyell, Charles Darwin, Thomas Henry Huxley – can be identified with a high 
degree of confidence, for their contemporaries the differentiation between ‘true’ 
and spurious science was by no means always clear. And even if it was, as in the 
case of Philip Henry Gosse’s theory of ‘prochronic creation’ discussed below, such 
interventions were not without effect. At the very least, they forced their oppo-
nents to strive for ever better foundations of what they tried to establish as the 
only valid scientific stance.6
Drawing on the work of historians and theorists of knowledge sometimes 
subsumed under the label New or Comparative Epistemology,7 a more heteroge-
neous, dynamic and recursive picture emerges than the story of linear progress. 
Ludwik Fleck, one of the founding fathers of this school of thought, describes sci-
ence as a social practice in terms of a complex web constantly undergoing subtle 
transformations, in contrast to a view of the history of science in terms of sci-
entific revolutions and epistemic breaks, as suggested by Thomas S. Kuhn and 
Michel Foucault. What is understood as knowledge in a given historical period 
and culture, according to Fleck, is not grounded in ‘objective facts’ or qualities in-
herent in natural phenomena, but is the result of shared preconceptions and prac-
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tices within a community or, in Fleck’s term, a ‘thought collective’ (Denkkollektiv); 
in other words, scientific knowledge is socially produced and, in consequence, 
inseparable from a prevalent ‘thought style’ (Denkstil).8 Crucially, this means that 
from an internal point of view, from within a thought collective, its own ‘knowl-
edge’ cannot be discerned as invalid: what knowledge is depends on the particu-
larities of a given thought style. Conversely, other, incompatible thought styles 
are perceived as ‘mysticism’: ‘Der fremde Gedankenstil mutet als Mystik an, die 
von ihm verworfenen Fragen werden oft als eben die wichtigsten betrachtet, die 
Erklärungen als nicht beweisend oder danebengreifend, die Probleme oft als un-
wichtige oder sinnlose Spielerei’.9
Applied to the nineteenth-century debates on geology, the question of divine 
agency bracketed off by Lyell, and finally laid to rest by Huxley’s introduction of 
‘agnosticism’ as the only acceptable stance of the scientist disregarding his per-
sonal beliefs,10 remains crucial for theologians such as Darwin’s critic Samuel 
Wilberforce. In Fleck’s epistemological model, the collective systems of knowl-
edge are relatively stable. They are gradually transformed through intercollective 
transactions, due to the fact that individuals never belong to only one collec-
tive, and through the generative function of language which not only reproduces 
knowledge but transforms it through processes of transmission and misrecog-
nition; the word serves as ‘an intercollective means of transport’ (interkollektives 
Verkehrsgut).11 According to Fleck, the transformation of knowledge is neither 
linear nor directed; it is socially produced and to a degree contingent. Finally, 
this concept allows us to perceive a-synchronicities within a historical period and 
culture: while one thought style (for instance, ‘mechanical objectivity’) will be 
dominant, and synchronous exchanges between specific thought collectives (for 
instance, philology and geology) do occur and produce something like a coherent 
albeit not monolithic epistēmē of a period, a-synchronic pockets of seemingly ob-
solete thought styles (such as the ‘delusion as to the age of the world’, the biblical 
six thousand years, denounced by Lyell12) can persist and unfold discursive effi-
cacy. For some participants in the debates on modern geology and, later, evolution 
theory, the belief in the validity of the Scriptures as an explicative framework for 
natural history continued to persist and was even hitched to a self-declared mod-
ern and enlightened notion of proper scientific knowledge. My main example, 
Philip Henry Gosse’s Omphalos (1857), shows the relevance of such a-synchronic 
pockets in the negotiations of authority, epistemological validity and the discur-
sive rules of scientific communities.
In sum, a notion of knowledge production based on Ludwik Fleck’s epistemolo-
gy allows us to perceive contemporaneous but contradictory narratives as the man-
ifestations of the continuous discursive and pragmatic interactions within the his-
tory of knowledge, rather than as a progressive overcoming of obsolete approaches 
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by more modern, more scientific ones. Fleck developed his epistemological model 
on the basis of his own microbiological and medical research. However, as Barbara 
Hernstein Smith has pointed out, his emphasis on ‘conceptual-discursive systems 
that both enable and constrain the process of cognition’,13 that is, systems embed-
ded in and effective through language, renders Fleck’s model pertinent for a his-
tory of knowledge that encompasses the humanities as well as the sciences. In 
particular, the constitution of the modern disciplines in the nineteenth century is 
the result of epistemological negotiations across various fields, of the competition 
to tell the best story about the emergence of the world and the creatures inhabit-
ing it. Importantly, this debate did not take place exclusively within the confines of 
the natural sciences – which emerged in the modern sense only as a result of this 
process of intra- and intercollective exchange – but at the intersection between 
natural history/science, the humanities and individual concerns about faith.
The difference between ‘knowledge’ and ‘mysticism’ emerges as the result of 
an ongoing and often contradictory, nonsynchronous process of practices and 
negotiations, a process increasingly studied in comparative epistemology. How-
ever, from the point of view of the humanities, there remain several desiderata: 
the history of knowledge is still centered on the natural sciences; the lab is the 
primary setting of studies in the wake of Fleck, Kuhn and Latour. Other sites 
of knowledge production – such as the discussion-based seminar, instituted at 
German universities after Wilhelm von Humboldt’s reform of higher education, 
and soon adopted by American universities – would yield a different picture 
regarding academic filiation and the formation of thought styles. In addition, 
reciprocal methodological exchanges between the sciences and the humanities 
require greater attention. To such an exchange, the humanities can contribute 
their hermeneutic and philological competence, specifically analytic skills such 
as the study of metaphors, of rhetorical devices and of linguistic modes, which 
has already been fruitfully applied to Darwin’s works.14 It is not by chance that 
Darwin’s style of writing – personal and engaging, narrative and metaphorical, 
and, as Beer and Levine have shown, deeply influenced by literary patterns – has 
attracted the attention of literary scholars. Similar studies need to be extended to 
less accommodating figures, and to fields that lend themselves less easily to nar-
rativization. Last but not least, the history of knowledge needs to become truly 
comparative. While studies on, for instance, Louis Pasteur have yielded impor-
tant insights into the workings of science as a network of diverse forces and inter-
ests,15 the implied concepts of knowledge production and implementation would 
gain in complexity from a consideration of the humanities. Fleck’s ‘intercollective 
means of transport’, language, forges connections between these different fields 
of enquiry. Ultimately, the making of the sciences cannot be separated from the 
making of the humanities.
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 II
In the early nineteenth century, the readings of the Book of Books and the Book 
of Nature are compatible; in both, God’s presence is revealed.16 A prime example 
of this, then still unproblematic harmony between theology and science is Wil-
liam Paley’s widely read Natural Theology (1802).17 Paley’s leading metaphor is 
the watch found in a country lane from which the existence of a watchmaker is 
necessarily deduced: without an artificer, there would not, could not be a watch. 
By analogy, the world and human beings, these intricate artifacts, could not exist 
without a creator. The hypothetical discovery that the watch contains a reproduc-
tive mechanism, in analogy to living organisms, would further heighten our belief 
in and admiration of the artificer:
The conclusion which the first examination of the watch, of its works, con-
struction, and movement suggested, was, that it must have had, for the 
cause and author of that construction, an artificer, who understood its 
mechanism, and designed its use. This conclusion is invincible. A second 
examination presents us with a new discovery. The watch is found, in the 
course of its movement, to produce another watch, similar to itself [...]. 
What effect would this discovery have, or ought to have, upon the former 
inference? What, as hath already been said, but to increase, beyond mea-
sure, our admiration of the skill, which had been employed in the forma-
tion of such a machine? Or shall it, instead of this, all turn us round to an 
opposite conclusion, viz. that no art or skill whatever has been concerned 
in the business, although all other evidences of art and skill remain as they 
were, and this last and supreme piece of art be now added to the rest? Can 
this be maintained without absurdity? Yet this is atheism.18
Within the thought style represented by Paley, it is not absurd to equate the mech-
anism of a watch with organic nature. Further, it is not absurd to imagine a watch 
that is capable of giving birth to baby watches. But it is absurd to imagine a world 
without a creator. The complexity, harmony and productivity of nature impera-
tively point to a higher intelligence, a creator and a plan of creation without which 
there would be only disorder and chaos. The postulate of purely naturalistic expla-
nations of the phenomena, put forward shortly after by Lyell, is for Paley unthink-
able. A world without a primary act of creation and without a telos is unthinkable. 
Atheism is not only wrong but also absurd, or, in Fleck’s term, it is ‘mysticism’.
This self-evident frame of reference was soon to be challenged by the histori-
cal criticism of the Bible on the one hand, and by the empirical-inductive meth-
odology in the sciences on the other. Lyell begins the Principles of Geology with 
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an overview of the history of his discipline, presented as a directed movement 
from speculation to the systematic collecting of empirical facts, from ‘vision’ to 
consistent method: ‘By acting up to these principles with consistency, they in a 
few years disarmed all prejudice, and rescued the science from the imputation 
of being a dangerous, or at best a visionary pursuit’.19 In consequence, geology 
was established as the leading science, opening up – quite against Lyell’s original 
intention – the temporal and methodological framework for Darwin’s transmu-
tation hypothesis. The emergence of a new geology constituted the move from 
the fantastic to the scientific, from the fabulous tales of medieval travelers to the 
exact observation of the Enlightenment – or again, from mysticism to true sci-
ence. What is now rejected as fabulous includes not only stories of unicorns, cy-
nocephali and other unlikely creatures, but also, for example, the story of Noah’s 
flood, shortly before cited as an explanation for the fossils of extinct species. In 
a relatively short time, the epistemological foundations of the study of the earth 
and the organisms living on its surface, and preserved as fossils in the different 
geological strata, had undergone a fundamental change.20 However, this does not 
mean that the transition from natural history, in which the Book of Nature and 
the Book of Books revealed God’s authorship, to natural science, in which these 
two ways of reading became systematically divorced, went uncontested. One of 
the most strenuous efforts to keep together what other scientists had put asunder, 
to reconcile Paley with Lyell, was made by Philip Henry Gosse.
In the 1840s and 1850s, Gosse was a respected naturalist specializing on litto-
ral flora and fauna, well-known for his books addressed to a popular as well as a 
learned audience, but also a devout Christian, a member of the particularly strict 
Plymouth Brethren – a position that was only tenable within the framework of 
natural theology which justified the study of nature as a way of discovering and 
praising the harmony of God’s creation.21 He saw the propositions of Lyellian 
geology as a contradiction to the superordinate teachings of the Bible: ‘the dicta, 
which its [geology’s] votaries rest on as certitudes, are at variance with the simple 
literal sense of the words of God’.22 In the late 1850s, Gosse belonged to a circle 
of naturalists who were discretely consulted about Darwin’s as yet unpublished 
hypothesis of evolution through natural selection. This confrontation with evolu-
tion theory triggered a deep spiritual crisis. As a way to reconcile the now sudden-
ly incompatible positions that constituted his identity as a Christian and a natu-
ralist, Gosse proposed his theory of ‘prochrony’ according to which there exist 
two temporal orders in creation. In diachronic creation, signs of maturation and 
aging, such as the growth rings of a tree or the wrinkles on a human face, develop 
in time; they are reliable indicators of the age of an organism or other natural 
object. Within the diachronic framework, geological formations that require long 
stretches of time to build up equally reliably point to the age of the earth; here, 
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Lyell’s principles of uniformitarianism, actualism and the steady-state earth – 
the constant and uninterrupted workings of natural laws – apply. Gosse devotes 
a sizable chunk of his book (pp. 30-101) to a detailed description of the recent 
advances in geology. It is not his aim to dispute the validity of these observations 
– he even explicitly confirms that the antediluvian theory is no longer tenable – 
but to offer an alternative hypothesis that would render science again compatible 
with the ‘simple literal sense of the words of God’.
This hypothesis is prochrony, a temporal order in which natural laws are sus-
pended: signs of maturation come into being at the moment of creation, just as Adam 
had been created as a grown man on the sixth day of creation. Not born of a woman 
but formed from clay, Adam still has a navel, the omphalos of Gosse’s title. The idea 
of prochrony is based on an alternative model of time, challenging the prevalent 
nineteenth-century notion of time as linear and directed, moving uniformly and in-
cessantly from the past to the future. By contrast, life to Gosse is cyclical, and God is 
free to start the cycle of life at whatever point he chooses; He can create the chick or 
the egg, and consequently, the existence of a full-grown hen is no proof for the prior 
existence of an egg. In geology, the material evidence that seemingly points to a long 
prehistory, and incidentally, the fossil evidence that supports the idea of transmuta-
tion, is subject to the law of prochrony: Just as He created Adam as an adult, God 
may have created an ‘old earth’, with signs of erosion, fossils and all.
As no direct empirical proof of prochrony is possible, Gosse uses a juridical 
metaphor to validate his thought experiment. In an imaginary trial, witnesses 
on both sides are examined; but, of course, there are no living witnesses for the 
evolutionary party, only circumstantial evidence:
No witness has deposed to actual observation of the processes above enu-
merated; no one has appeared in court who declares he actually saw the 
living Pterodactyls flying about, or heard the winds sighing in the tops of the 
Lepidodendra. [...] Strong as is the evidence, it is not quite so strong as if you 
had actually seen the living things, and had been conscious of the passing 
of time while you saw them live. It is only by a process of reasoning that you 
infer they lived at all.23
Gosse indirectly points to an epistemological weakness in Charles Darwin’s argu-
mentation that would not escape his critics on the publication of On the Origin of 
Species two years later. Darwin uses cumulative circumstantial evidence that, ac-
cording to Gosse and other critics, only suggests that there exists empirical proof of 
evolution. The actual transition of one species into another could not be conclusively 
proven until the discovery of the Archaeopteryx and similar intermediary fossils.24 
The emerging disciplines of paleoarcheology and comparative anatomy drew their 
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conclusions on the basis of a fossil record that Darwin himself referred to as in-
complete and barely readable: ‘the natural geological record’ is ‘a history of the world 
imperfectly kept, and written in a changing dialect’.25 Darwin here takes up the an-
cient topos of the Book of Nature, but disputes its readability. The study of nature 
shows how geological and biological ‘dialects’ are transformed over time. In analogy 
to the linguistic study of the Indo-European languages, the fossils first discovered 
in Europe and the Americas, including dinosaurs, cumulatively suggest that extant 
species had similar but extinct ancestors, and that some species died out without 
leaving behind similarly formed relatives.26 The fossils thus tell a different story than 
the Bible, a contradiction that is acknowledged by Gosse: ‘the records which seem 
legibly written on His created works do flatly contradict the statements which seem 
to be plainly expressed in His word’.27 However, as Gosse argues, two principles are 
axiomatic: that matter was created, i.e., that ‘the Eternal God [...] called the universe 
into being out of nothing’,28 and that the species were created immutable. Conse-
quently, the conclusions drawn from fossils must be a fallacy. The only interpretation 
which allows us to overcome the discrepancy between the ‘stone book’29 and the re-
vealed word is precisely the law of prochrony. Taking into account God’s unlimited 
creative power, the unquestioned primary condition of Gosse’s argument, fossils do 
not point to antecedent species; bones are no proof of previous life:
If I could show, to your satisfaction, that a skeleton might have existed; still 
more, that a skeleton must have existed; still more, if I could prove that myr-
iads of skeletons, precisely like this, must have existed, without ever having 
formed parts of antecedent living bodies; you would yourself acknowledge 
that your conclusions were untenable.30
Having formulated this hypothesis which is mainly based on the petitioning of 
the very principles under negotiation (creation and the absence of evolution), 
Gosse takes us, his readers, by the hand and leads us through the classes of the 
plants, invertebrates, vertebrata and finally man – who forms a class, and gets 
a chapter, of his own. Gosse asks the readers to imagine a full-grown exemplar 
from various species – a sturdy oak, a majestic stag, an adult man – and then, 
further to imagine that this apparently mature organism has been created on this 
very day. The oak’s year rings, the stag’s antlers, the man’s wrinkles and grizzled 
hair, all the signs of growth and aging are prochronic, they have come into being 
at the moment of creation, on this very day. Unlike the circumstantial evidence 
of the fossils, these acts of prochronic creation are confirmed by, albeit fictitious, 
eye-witnesses. We, his implied readers, have seen them with our mind’s eye. Bet-
ter than that, the most eminent witness imaginable, God himself, has deposed 
His evidence in writing, in the story told in Genesis.
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The rhetorical structure of Gosse’s argument consists in an apparently sys-
tematic accumulation of hypothetical statements, which through reiteration ac-
quire empirical weight, or so the author hopes. This rhetoric is not dissimilar to 
Darwin’s, who also relies heavily on anecdotal evidence, analogy and seriality. In 
Darwin’s writing, the piling up of examples creates an aura of empiricism without 
always constituting an impeccable chain of evidence. However, the grammatical 
trajectory appears to be reversed in the two authors. In Gosse’s presentation of 
arguments we find a constant slippage from the subjunctive to the affirmative, 
from might to must, as in the example above. Whereas Darwin stresses the tenta-
tive and often preliminary nature of his theory formation, but uses this epistemic 
modesty as a strategy of self-authorization, as can be seen in the opening para-
graphs of On the Origin of Species, Gosse strings together his imagined scenes of 
creation to form declarative statements that finally flow into rhetorical questions:
Who will say that the suggestion, that the strata of the surface of the earth, 
with their fossil floras and faunas, may possibly belong to a prochronic develop-
ment of the mighty plan of the life-history of this world – who will dare to say 
that such a suggestion is a self-evident absurdity?31
Of course, everyone dared to say this. Gosse’s suggestive declaratives and rhetori-
cal questions failed to convince both his lay readers and his fellow scientists. With 
the publication of Omphalos, Gosse took up an a-synchronic position in relation 
to the dominant epistemic virtues of his time, and thus effectively isolated him-
self from the scientific community of which he had been a respected member, as 
his son Edmund Gosse describes in his memoirs:
In the course of that dismal winter, as the post began to bring in private let-
ters, few and chilly, and public reviews, many and scornful, my Father looked 
in vain for the approval of the churches, and in vain for the acquiescence of 
the scientific societies, and in vain for the gratitude of those ‘thousands of 
thinking persons’, which he had rashly assured himself of receiving.32
The thought collective that had gathered around Lyell, Darwin, Huxley and the 
botanist Joseph Hooker from the 1840s onward, while internally divided on the 
question of evolution theory,33 were clearly in agreement on the discursive rules 
that facilitated the distinction between true science and mere speculation. The 
principle rule, as Huxley was to stipulate later, consisted in the epistemological 
privileging of naturalism – the observance of natural laws – against received au-
thority including the Bible; in consequence, ‘the assertion which outstrips evidence 
is not only a blunder but a crime’.34 On the basis of this rule, writers indulging in 
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insufficiently founded scientific speculation such as Gosse, Robert Chambers, the 
author of the evolutionary Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844), or Al-
fred Russel Wallace, the codiscoverer of natural selection but in his later life an ad-
herent of spiritualism, were excluded from the circle of leading British scientists.
 III
Debates in the 1850s and 1860s about the best story in science, the most plausible 
explanation of the natural world and man’s position in it, hinged on what Lor-
raine Daston and Peter Galison have called ‘a distinct code of epistemic virtue’,35 a 
code which had changed significantly since the days of natural theology. In order 
to be perceived as valid, a scientific theory had to adhere to this code, and its 
author had to position himself accordingly to gain acceptance by the dominant 
thought collective. If he failed to do so, criticism of his work was correspondingly 
devastating. In the following review, the author is criticized harshly for his faulty 
methodology: his theory is fantastic, fabulous, a relapse into the unenlightened 
times before the rise of modern science. According to the reviewer, the anecdotal 
procedure and the deviation from established principles of scientific enquiry lead 
the author straight back into the times of miracles and wonders:
Under such influences man soon goes back to the marvelling stare of child-
hood at the centaurs and hippogriffs of fancy [...]. The whole world of nature 
is laid for such a man under a fantastic law of glamour, and he becomes ca-
pable of believing anything: to him it is just as probable that Dr. Livingstone 
will find the next tribe of negroes with their heads growing under their arms 
as fixed on the summit of the cervical vertebrae; and he is able, with a con-
tinually growing neglect of all the facts around him, with equal confidence 
and equal delusion, to look back to any past and to look on to any future.36
This, of course, is not taken from a review of Gosse’s Omphalos but of Darwin’s 
Origin of Species, written by one of the most vociferous opponents of evolution 
theory, Samuel Wilberforce. This quotation is not meant to suggest that the 
scientific validity of Gosse’s theory of prochrony and Darwin’s evolution theory 
is interchangeable. What I have tried to show throughout this paper, however, 
is that the delimitation between the iterable and the absurd in the history of 
knowledge depends on a situated logic which is co-emergent with the discursive 
acts themselves. For Paley, the absurd is something else than for Lyell; for Gosse, 
it is something else than for Darwin; for Wilberforce, something else than for 
Huxley.
75Theology, Geology, and Philip Henry Gosse’s Omphalos
From today’s perspective, Gosse’s theory of prochrony appears as a clear-cut 
case of bad science. However, as this case study has tried to show, Gosse made 
every effort to adapt his proposition to the discursive strategies and epistemic 
virtues of his time: he laid the basis for his argument by recapitulating extensively 
the findings of geology and paleoarcheology, and by admitting, up to a point, their 
validity. It is not so much his way of reasoning that departs from the thought style 
of the Lyell-Darwin-Huxley-Hooker nexus, but his axiomatic premise – God 
created the world and every living creature as stated in Genesis – and hence, his 
deduction – God also created the fossils, as fossils – that resulted in the general 
rejection of his theory. Gosse’s attempt to reconcile science with revealed religion 
was doomed to fail not only because the scientific part of his argument was so 
outrageous, but because his theology was old-fashioned, or too radical, by the 
standards of mainstream theologians of his day. By ignoring the philological turn 
in Bible studies and insisting on a literal reading of the word of God, he broke 
the connection with the dominant thought collectives in both fields, theology as 
well as natural science. By insisting that God still matters in scientific theories, 
Gosse repudiated the agnostic and naturalistic stance proposed by Huxley as the 
best, and only, stance within the emerging framework of modern disciplines. As 
a result of his infringement of epistemic codes that had only recently been estab-
lished, and still believing himself on firm epistemic ground, Gosse positioned 
himself beyond the pale of ‘true science’ and was discarded like one of the fossils 
he had studied on England’s beaches.
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